THE New Republic

A Proposal On Presidential Disability

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UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT

End of the Postwar World

By WALTER LIPPMANN

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APRIL 15, 1957

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Washington Wire

The All-Corporate Team

IN 1952 Eisenhower promised to bring the "best brains" to government and we've been checking up on how this works out diplomatically. At the summit they're obviously a fine group—all businessmen. Indeed, they come from such lofty corporate posts that it seems easier to identify the latest shifts by companies rather than as individuals. In London we are substituting J. H. Whitney & Co. (Wall Street bankers) for American Tel. and Tel. Over in Paris Corning Glass takes over. In Rome it's time for Luce Publications to step down and Crown-Zellerbach (paper company) to represent America.

These ambassadors are considered a first line of defense against war, and we find it wonderfully stimulating to speculate on the effectiveness of the new all-corporate team against the H-bomb. Houghton at Paris is a businessman who doesn't speak French; David K. Bruce, new businessman-ambassador to Germany, doesn't speak German; businessman Zellerbach at Rome says he knows enough Italian "to order a meal." Fine, we say! That shows these men are approaching their work without preconceptions; if they care to learn the foreign gab, why, tycoons are quick, and Jock Whitney at London (who contributed $47,100 to the Republicans last year) both reads and speaks fluent English.

American career diplomats under our admirable system of saving taxpayers' money are confined to lesser posts which they can afford. But Eisenhower's "best brains" include some oddities even here. In Ireland, William Howard Taft III is being dropped for Scott McLeod, McCarthy's State Department security man, whose activities have done so much to lower foreign service morale. This is regarded as an admirable appointment because it gets him out of the country. Strangest nomination, from this column's viewpoint is Henry J. Taylor, the ex-General Motors' NBC news commentator, to replace career diplomat Miss Frances Willis in Switzerland.

Some years ago we noted a Taylor pronouncement in which he seriously equated the British Labour Party with Moscow's Communism. Taylor has struck us as an irresponsible journalist with McCarthy-type leanings. We rather doubt whether Senate Democrats would confirm Taylor if they examined his writings, but they probably won't bother.

Floating, Floating

EISENHOWER'S two big helicopters, worth $80,000 each, arrived in the midst of the economy battle. They are Bell Aircraft jobs, thoroughly soundproofed, with plastic front, and carry pilot and two passengers. The question at the press conference, March 27, whether the 'copters would be used for golf course trips brought the angriest comment the increasingly harassed President has given in four years. As Eric Sevareid noted, many reporters went to the press conference after looking at a biting Herblock cartoon "showing a smirking President floating in a helicopter over the heads of a mass of men struggling with each other on civil rights, education, budget and so on." Herblock implied that the President was running, or rather floating, away from his responsibilities.

The fact is Eisenhower is now waist-deep in the first really major attack on his policies by a nation-wide group within his party, expertly organized by the US Chamber of Commerce and similar business outfits and pushed by the Hearst, Scripps-Howard and Knight press, the *Wall Street Journal, Chicago Tribune* and the like. It is not just an attack on "the budget"; Eisenhower's program *is* the budget. Even now we cannot say with conviction that the President knows he is in a fight. It is being promoted from within the Cabinet, in fact if not in name, by Treasury Secretary Humphrey and Undersecretary Burgess whose views are patently irreconcilable with Eisenhower utterances, though he does not seem aware of it.

"Leading the Way"

THERE'S always this vagueness about the President! Even now he may yield on his budget (which we think is a pretty good one, all told). Supporters of federal aid to education seized on Eisenhower's speech last week. Said the *New York Times*, for example, the "appeal" should be granted, "the President is leading the way."

But actually President Eisenhower's speech was very diffuse and casual. It offered generalized support for education, which the President quoted Lincoln as saying was a good thing. It didn't have the punch to win five Republican votes for the big battle ahead.

We keep being asked about the President's health. Mistakenly, we think, the discussion of the proposed disability amendment has been interpreted by millions as indicating his health is worse. This isn't true. He is no weaker and not much older than before the election. But since he can't run again, the protective journalistic screen has partly come down and the stark facts remain. The job of President demands full-time, vital vigor, and of course the President doesn't have it. It is too bad, but that is the way it is.

Negroes will make a pilgrimage to Washington May 17 to observe the third anniversary of the Supreme Court's unanimous school desegregation decision. A minimum of 50,000 are expected. They have invited Eisenhower and Nixon to visit their communities in the South—no comment; they have invited them to give moral approval of the Court's decision—no comment. Now they come here instead.

Remember the Days

NEWSPAPERS are still busy unmasking Teamster Dave Beck. We wish they would air three points: In the days of his respectability the AMA delighted to make him their featured speaker to denounce "socialized medicine." He was the kind of a man to be made a regent by the kind of school the University of Washington is, where he voted to fire a batch of professors for "taking the Fifth." Finally, he has been an ardent free-enterprise, anti-welfare state Republican from first to last.

Justice Frankfurter recently obliquely attacked the latest Eisenhower over-simplification—that judicial experience is necessary for a Justice to the policy-making court.

T.R.B.

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The New Republic

A JOURNAL OF OPINION

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Nixon's Responsibility

MR. EISENHOWER has long been concerned, understandably so, over how the government is to be run in the event of serious and prolonged Presidential disability. But his solution for the problem guarantees that it will not be solved during Mr. Eisenhower's second term. He has proposed, through his Attorney General, that a constitutional amendment be adopted allowing a majority of the Cabinet to decide when and for how long the Vice President may take over as Acting President, assuming the Chief Executive is incapable of making that decision himself.

There are many sound objections to the President's specific remedy, but the pertinent political one is that it hasn't a chance of being approved by the necessary two-thirds majority of the Congress. Once the debate over constitutional amendments has begun, the country is beset by countless and conflicting legal and political arguments. The various recommendations of experts on this problem of Presidential inability take up 267 pages of small type in the hearings held last year, and this before a special committee of the House Judiciary Committee. It is near impossible to get a consensus on what constitutional change is best. There is only a consensus on the danger to our national security which arises when executive authority is paralyzed.

This being so, why does the President insist on a constitutional amendment? Attorney General Brownell himself admits that "the constitution now vests the power of determining inability [of the President] in the Vice President; and that the Vice President could not constitutionally be divested of this power without a constitutional amendment." Why should the Vice President be stripped of this authority, especially since, as Mr. Brownell further comments, "as a practical matter a Vice President would not undertake the exercise of Presidential power during a period of Presidential inability without first consulting the Cabinet"?

What the Attorney General and others who favor a constitutional amendment argue is that although the Vice President could act, he would not act, fearing the charge of usurpation of power. And it must be granted that this argument has historical persuasiveness. But could not this very human reluctance be modified, if not overcome, by the adoption of a joint Congressional resolution, subsequently signed by the President, simply making explicit what is now implicit in the constitution, clarifying the inherent right of the Vice President to assume the powers and duties of the Presidency should Presidential disability require that assumption?

The attempt to anticipate and provide for all contingencies is bound to be self-defeating. One ought to retain some faith in the effectiveness of public opinion. If the President were stricken during a time of evident national or international crisis, would not the country demand that the Vice President take over leadership? Simplicity and the centering or responsibility on one person seem to us the better part of political wisdom.

Correspondence

► *Let's trade Dulles to China*

SIRS:

WE now have the official testimony of Undersecretary of State Murphy that Secretary Dulles will not allow American newspaper correspondents to go to Communist China, in exchange for the release of eight Americans held prisoner there, because that would be yielding to blackmail. If the United States holds firm, Mr. Dulles believes, the Americans will ultimately be released anyway. In other words, he would rather than get them out by merely restoring rights which he himself has arbitrarily and unlawfully taken away from American newsmen.

On the unlikely assumption that Dwight D. Eisenhower is disposed for once in his life to act as President, here is a suggestion for him. Let him make a trade with the Chinese, giving them Mr.

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It may be asked whether we want Richard Nixon running the country in the unfortunate event that Mr. Eisenhower cannot. The answer is yes. That is his constitutional obligation. The decisions of Mr. Nixon would be far better than no decisions at all.

Delay on Civil Rights

WHEN THIS Congress opened, House Speaker Rayburn and Senate Leader Johnson surprised everyone by favoring a vote on civil rights early in the session. It would save time in the long run, the Texans explained, and more important, it would help pass a school-aid bill thereafter. Having already voted for a civil-rights law, members would be under less pressure to vote for a Powell ("no-segregation") amendment to the school bill—which would kill it.

But Johnson's and Rayburn's blessing proved to be no open sesame. Southerners on the Judiciary Committees of both houses have strung out hearings on the President's civil-rights proposals interminably. Senator Eastland won't bring the bill to a vote in the Senate Committee. And a combination of Republicans and Southern Democrats have the House bill locked up tight in the Rules Committee.

The danger now is that House passage of the new law will come so late that Southern Senators will be able to sustain a filibuster until the session runs out. There are two ways to prevent this. In the House, the coming recess April 19-28, can be used to line up support for a discharge petition to free the bill from the Rules Committee and force a vote early in May. In the Senate, then, Eastland can be outmaneuvered by forcing consideration of the House bill without sending it to his committee. Under the Senate rules, at the moment when the chair asks unanimous consent to refer a bill to the proper committee, it is in order to move to suspend the rules in order to consider the bill without committee referral. To succeed, however, this strategy takes careful organization. Last year when Sen. Paul Douglas attempted it, he was thwarted by having the bill referred to committee while he was off the floor. To be sure of being present to object at the exact moment the bill was brought over from the House, Douglas had walked across to the lower body to escort the messenger delivering the bill. They passed each other in the hall.

Investment in Security

IF THE MORE enlightened views of Undersecretary of State Christian Herter prevail within the Administration—and we believe they will—the President will shortly send to Congress a new proposal for long-range, foreign economic aid. And if Congress is by then no more enlightened on money matters than it is today, we can expect that the Mutual Security funds requested by the President will be cut anywhere from $1 billion to $2 billion.

Under Herter's personal leadership, the State Department has decided to support the principal recommendations in the Eric Johnston report, issued by the White House on March 1 in the name of the President's International Development Advisory Board. Although the conclusions of this report have yet to be okayed by the Secretary of the Treasury or Clarence Randall, the President's assistant for foreign economic policy, the substance of it was laid before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by John Foster Dulles on April 7.

Should the Administration's recommendations be followed, the more than $3 billion worth of military aid in this year's $4.4 billion program would be incorporated in the Defense budget and no longer be made subject to separate annual authorizations. Also, a new and substantial loan fund would be established for the financing of long-term, low-interest development projects which do not meet the lending requirements of the World Bank. Congress would be asked to authorize the fund's operation for several years and to set a ceiling on its expenditures. But the dollars available to the fund for foreign loans would come not from Congressional appropriations but from the issue of notes of indebtedness given by the fund to the US Treasury—the same system used by the Export-Import Bank and the Commodity Credit Corporation.

Technical assistance, the least controversial aspect of Mutual Security spending, would still require annual Congressional authorization. So would outright dollar grants (in distinction to loans), and these will probably be smaller than in the past.

The establishment of such a loan fund would give the President powers for which he has repeatedly and rightfully asked: continuity in foreign aid programs and

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administrative "flexibility" in the apportioning of aid, thus ending the present practice of appropriating money in precise amounts for each country or region.

The battle will begin, as it usually does these days, when Congress examines the cost. The President has already said that aid should continue on a "plateau," that is, at about the present level. A realistic calculation of Mutual Security funds now spent on roads, ports, power, irrigation and other development projects abroad, however, shows that the cost is closer to $1 billion than to the $400 million listed as "development assistance" in the present Mutual Security Act. The difference is hidden under various military headings. Once more, if Mr. Eisenhower is to have his way—and he should on this—he will have to put his salesmanship to full use.

Blindmen's Bluff

How our not permitting US newsmen to go to China is going to get eight Americans out of Communist Chinese prisons is a conundrum. And so is Mr. Dulles' fear that if journalists enter China, Christian missionaries could legitimately demand the same privilege. Granted that reporters sometimes get out of hand and say things they shouldn't (from officialdom's point of view), does Churchman Dulles really believe that efforts to spread the gospel in Communist countries should be discouraged?

We're puzzled not because Mr. Dulles hasn't tried to tell us why he does what he does. We have read his explanations; we just don't understand them. Perhaps we haven't yet grasped the rudiments of Double-Think: blackmail, by definition, is what other people do to you, never what you do to them; ignorance is better than knowledge; un-freedom is better than freedom.

Now the Department has officially declined to renew the passport of correspondent William Worthy, whose informative description of the difficulties in reporting from China were published by us last month. If his passport had been renewed, it would have been "prejudicial to the interests of the United States." What interests? Certainly not the interests of the American people who would like to know more than they do about China. US interests in Asia? But who in Asia, other than the South Koreans and Chiang Kai-shek, agree with Mr. Dulles' un-policy of non-communication with the Communists?

The story becomes curiouser and curioser. Edmund Stevenson of *Look* magazine also defied the Department and went to China. Thereafter, he was told by Ambassador Bohlen in Moscow that when his passport comes up for renewal it will be stamped good only for return to the UN, but that before this happens, Stevens could have a hearing before the Department. Stevens promptly petitioned for a hearing. *Look* also wrote the Department requesting a hearing. That was about seven weeks ago. Neither request has yet been acknowledged.

"Because I Said So—That's Why"

The Israeli Showdown

Nothing that has been said by anybody during the past week can be reassuring to the Israelis. They are threatened from the East and cautioned by the West, and since no nation can live forever in uncertainty where its survival is at stake, the Israelis are going to force a clarification of their rights. As soon as the Suez Canal is again in general use, but before Nasser can rebuild his army, the Israelis will send some of their ships into the Canal.

Both President Eisenhower and Secretary General Hammarskjold have said they "assume" Egypt will not interfere with passage, an attitude described cynically as "the doctrine of the immaculate assumption." Egypt has permitted no Israeli ship through the Canal since 1951, when the only Israeli vessel to request passage was seized and its crew imprisoned. Radio Cairo predicts that history will repeat itself if the Israelis persist in putting free passage to further test.

If the ship is stopped, Israel will no doubt take its case to the Security Council, charging violation by Egypt of the Security Council resolution of October 13, 1956. Israel will ask Mr. Eisenhower to back up his February 20, 1957, declaration in which he said that if Egypt again violated its international obligations, the society of nations must deal firmly with Nasser.

The showdown in the Gulf of Aqaba will come a

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month later—in late May—when the first large Israeli ship sails into the Straits of Tiran. In all probability, the UN Emergency Force now occupying the Egyptian shoreline would head off any Egyptian military action, but the opposite shore along the 7-mile-wide Strait is occupied by Saudi Arabian troops. A ship that ventures into the straits can be stopped only by shooting, and Israeli gun-boats are available to return the fire. Result: another item on the Security Council agenda.

What support the Israelis can expect from our government in these tests of Egypt's asserted "rights of belligerency" is left in doubt by President Eisenhower's remarks during his April 3 press conference. "We should not assume," said the President, "that Egypt will violate the 1888 Convention, but the only excuse they have, as I see it, is their claims to belligerency. Exactly how that point is to be settled, I don't know."

Nor do the Israelis know. But they mean to find out.

ARAB UNITY IS NOT BREAKING APART

Beirut

THE activity of the Richards mission in the Middle East, coupled with attempts on the part of the Lebanese and Iraqi governments to reach a better understanding with King Saud, have given rise to a flood of reports concerning a major realignment of the Arab states. The gist of the reports is that Saudi Arabia is weakening in its attachment to the bloc of self-styled "liberated" Arab states—Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia—the natural result of which would be better relations with the more pro-Western elements among the Lebanese and Iraqis.

So far, however, we have no serious evidence to suggest that a realignment is at hand. On the contrary, King Saud's government was the first to declare support for Egypt in the wrangle over freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba, and is now, in agreement with its allies of the "Arab Solidarity Pact," moving troops up to Aqaba to lend weight to its views.

In fact, US prestige has suffered a setback in most of the Arab world, as a result of the decision of the Administration to join the military committee of the Baghdad Pact. Suliman Nabulsi, the Prime Minister of Jordan, has declared roundly that in taking this decision

> . . . America revealed her own value. It has now become clear that she intends to interfere directly in the affairs of this area and to draw up plans for defending it to which the Arabs do not agree and which they view with anxiety and suspicion.

The interview given by President Nasser to a group of American newspaper editors two weekends ago was bitter in tone: "the United States is aiming to starve us while the Soviet Union is aiming to help us."

Western opinion, ever prone to wishful thinking in regard to the Middle East, has hailed the talks between President Chamoun of the Lebanon and King Saud as a victory. But study of the joint communique summarizing their talks does not confirm that optimism. As a result of their conference, the Lebanese government is committed to supporting the Arab nationalist view in respect to Palestine, Algeria, the Yemen and Buraimi, and to backing Egyptian claims in respect of the Gulf of Aqaba, the Tiran Straits and the Suez Canal.

What has the West got in return? There is the statement in the communique condemning interference from outside in the affairs of any Arab state. In the eyes of Lebanese President Chamoun and Dr. Charles Malik, his Foreign Minister, this statement was undoubtedly directed against Egypt. In the eyes of King Saud and his government, it was more probably directed against Britain, France and Iraq. (The Syrian charge that the recent conspiracy against the Damascus government was inspired, financed and armed by Iraq is firmly believed in Saudi Arabia).

There is also the declaration that the two countries will co-operate in the struggle against Communism and subversive activity. But this is balanced by a pledge to co-operate in counteracting imperialist and Zionist propaganda, and in any case it means very little in practice. Communism has always been illegal in Saudi Arabia, and the Saudi government draws a sharp distinction between Communism and the Soviet Government.

There is in fact nothing in the communique to which Nasser would demur.

King Saud's visit to Baghdad, planned for early May, has also been interpreted as a favorable omen. The Iraqi government certainly hopes that it will yield fruit; during the recent Development Week celebrations in Iraq, conspicious consideration was paid to the three-man press delegation from Saudi Arabia. But the visit of King Faisal to King Saud last autumn had no tangible result, and there is little reason to suppose that King Saud's return visit will achieve much more. It will certainly be more than a courtesy call; but there is no evidence—yet—to suggest that the talks will modify King Saud's attitude toward the Baghdad Pact or Iraqi Premier Nuri es-Said's hostility to Nasser. Unless something really big happens in April, I would expect the Saudi-Iraqi talks to result in a communique on the same lines as that issued after the Saudi-Lebanese conference, with perhaps an added clause confirming the existing agreement for the exchange of information on "oil matters."

H. A. R. PHILBY

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The Great Incorruptible Walks Out

by HUGH MASSINGHAM

THE resignation of Lord Salisbury from the Macmillan Government is the most dramatic development in British politics since the departure of Sir Anthony Eden. For Lord Salisbury was more than just a Minister, or even an important Minister: he was the king-maker of the Conservative Party, the man who is chiefly responsible for putting Mr. Macmillan into No. 10 Downing Street.

Americans, who have never enjoyed the ineffable bliss of having a House of Lords of their own, may find it a little difficult to understand why Lord Salisbury had so much influence. No doubt, like the beef-eaters who show you around the Tower of London, he might look picturesque in his Coronation robes, but surely he could be no more than a beautiful oddity in a modern democracy? The answer to this riddle is not easy. It is partly that Lord Salisbury is a Cecil, and the Cecils have devotedly served their country for some 400 years. There has hardly been a period of English history during that long time when some member of the family has not been close to the seat of power, though his presence may not always have been detected by the general public.

But there were some personal reasons for Lord Salisbury's great influence. Whatever his defects no one has ever questioned his integrity. His colleagues might disagree with his opinions and become irritated by his obstinacy, but they all knew that he was incapable of the meaner intrigues. Cut off from the highest office in the State because he was a member of the House of Lords, he was accepted as one of those rare persons who seek nothing for themselves and who speak without any ulterior motive. Selflessness not being among the commoner virtues of politicians, Lord Salisbury was listened to with the awe normally accorded only to seers and prophets.

What was no less remarkable was his utter fearlessness. During the war when Churchill was at the height of his power and completely dominated his Cabinet, he was the only Minister who consistently spoke his mind. Sitting sprawled out in his chair and holding a cigarette as if it were some exquisite but fragile gem, he would suddenly startle his colleagues by saying, in his slightly lisping voice, "I don't agree." In the circumstances of the time this was often considered near blasphemy.

Americans may now perhaps realize why his resignation was such a bombshell. The great Incorruptible, the high priest of Toryism who was superstitiously believed to number the Holy Grail among his family heirlooms, suddenly departed, and the faithful had a dreadful feeling that virtue might have gone out in the process.

Besides he could not have left at a more unfortunate moment. Is it really only three months ago since Mr. Macmillan celebrated his selection as Prime Minister by dining at the Turf Club on oysters and champagne? Despite the difficulties of the situation, there was at the time an under-current of optimism in Government circles. Sir Anthony Eden had gone and Sir Anthony in those days had come to symbolize procrastination, weakness, a pervading futility. A strong captain on the bridge would surely mean a fresh start, a new deal? For this reason there was plenty of confidence, even though it was still painfully obvious that the public was not convinced. Whatever good opinion Ministers might have of themselves, their middle-class supporters in the country, driven into rebellion by rising prices and high taxation, remained obstinately sullen and critical. Indeed the by-elections that have taken place during the last three months have shown that there is a swing against the Tory Government of about 5 percent.

It was by no means disastrous. Given time—and, in theory, the Macmillan government still has about three years to run—there was no reason why Ministers should not work out a policy that would satisfy the rank-and-file. These were the days when Ministers often talked about "riding the storm"—kindly, comforting words. People who use them normally assume that all they have to deal with is one of those spritely freaks of spring: subconsciously, they see themselves taking the ferry between Dover and Calais on a boisterous day in April. But supposing their calculations are wrong? Supposing the frisky breezes turn into gales and those playful waves charge the little boat with the ferocity of maddened whales? What then? Ah, what indeed!

This, in fact, is what has been happening to the Macmillan Government. No one three months ago could have supposed that Lord Salisbury, of all people, would resign. No one could have conceived that Colonel Nasser would be saying that the British must pay their Suez dues in dollars—dollars that the British can ill afford to spare. And another factor that Americans will find hard to appreciate. Lord Salisbury resigned only a few hours after the conclusion of the Bermuda Conference.

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Now Americans are apt to think of Englishmen as Machiavellis, forever spinning diabolical plots to ensnare their rugged but simple-minded representatives. It will perhaps surprise them to learn that there are now a number of British Conservatives who feel exactly the same about the State Department. The British are the simpletons, the Americans are the cunning Lucifers. Mr. Angus Maude, an able Tory intellectual who has done a great deal both to create and to express this attitude of mind, put the point perfectly the other day in an article on the Queen's suggested visit to the United States. "Should the Queen go to America?" he asked in a great dark headline. And underneath was the grim sub-title, "I say: Instead, let Eisenhower come HERE." The question, in fact, is "whether America ought to be considered as a friendly State or not."

His argument is worth following, mainly because it is important in itself but also because it adds a fresh excitement to the Salisbury drama. What is the British case against America? Mr. Maude spells it all out, word by word and line by line. The policy of the State Department, he says, "has for many years been one of unremitting hostility toward British interests abroad." Mr. Maude even invokes the ghost of Roosevelt. America's "ignorant prejudice against British 'Colonialism'" led Roosevelt to the "happy idea" during the war of the British handing over Hong Kong to China, in the naïve belief that "the Colony was the personal property of King George VI who could give it away as the fancy took him." Then look, Mr. Maude goes on, at the American attitude on Cyprus. "Look, too, at the determination of the Americans to get us out of our Suez base in 1953." Since then there has been yet another betrayal —"the spectacle of our American allies ganging up in the United Nations with the Communist bloc and the Afro-Asians—in fact, all the totalitarian countries of the world—to prevent us from defending our vital interests in the Middle East." In a word Eisenhower and Dulles have been squeezing "the last drop of humiliation from our defeat."

There, in this brief summary, you have the bitter feeling of many British Conservatives. You have, too, the explosive element within the Salisbury drama. Even before the announcement of the resignation there were a number of Tory back benchers who were deeply uneasy over the results of the Bermuda Conference. Some criticized the agreement on guided missiles, saying that as the warheads would remain in the charge of the Americans Britain would lose all liberty of action. The United States, they argued, was going "to keep the key of the cupboard" and in future "British policy will be made in Washington and not in London." Others became convinced that the President had forced Mr. Macmillan to climb down on Cyprus—that the decision to release Archbishop Makarios had been taken in Bermuda and not inside the Cabinet. Thus when Lord Salisbury resigned on this very point, it seemed that a new wave of anti-Americanism would break out and end by sweeping Mr. Macmillan from office.

And yet within 24 hours the situation had completely changed. For on the day that Lord Salisbury resigned and we were all putting on our black ties and composing the last sad speeches for the impending funeral, the Labour Party's Mr. George Brown—that same Mr. Brown who so infuriated Khrushchev during the B. and K. visit to Britain—gave a broadcast on defense which threw the Labour Party into the utmost confusion. British Socialism has always been against the use of force and Mr. Brown's gay assurance that he would not only build the hydrogen bomb but, in certain circumstances, would even drop it inevitably roused a storm of anger among those who have pacifist leanings. By the time Mr. Macmillan rose in the House to defend the Bermuda Conference it was the members of the Opposition, and not the Government's supporters, who were divided. And who remain divided. Brilliantly playing on the Labour Party's inner contradictions, Mr. Macmillan not only succeeded in restoring the morale of his own side but still further increased the divisions within the Opposition. When two days later the Unions called off the strikes in the shipbuilding and engineering industries the crisis was over. Lord Salisbury had disappeared without leaving a trace.

Indeed there are Conservatives who think that the resignation may turn out to be a blessing. For as the years passed; as he retired into a private day dream, there were times when his startled colleagues came to feel that he was living in the 16th Century of Elizabeth I rather than the modern times of Elizabeth II. The Spanish Armada, he seemed to be thinking, was on its way: the British must call for Drake. It was not just that he was reactionary on every conceivable subject. He was out of touch with any kind of reality. To leave the Government in the middle of two great strikes, when the ship had sprung a leak and all hands were at the pumps, would seem, in a normal man, the height of irresponsiblity. Far from sympathizing with him, most Conservatives feel nothing but impatience and anger.

There is another reason why some of them believe that his resignation may do more good than harm. Since the war the Party has been struggling to get away from its aristocratic past, to prove that it is no longer in the pocket of the rich or the high born. While Lord Salisbury remained so near the throne, these democratic pretensions always appeared a trifle spurious. The cloth caps which Tories hastily put on at election time in order to show that they are really honest working men at heart only seemed hired for the occasion. Now that Lord Salisbury has gone and his power has been broken, perhaps forever, the Party should be able to recite its democratic lines far more convincingly.

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End of the Postwar World

Within recent weeks, our government has announced that a cessation of nuclear bomb tests is not feasible, that atomic warheads will be made available to our NATO allies in the event of an emergency, that long-range guided missiles will be delivered by us to the British. The British in turn have revolutionized their defense program, relying on hydrogen bombs and ballistic rockets. The Russians have reacted sharply by promising to "strengthen most decisively the Warsaw Pact," by charging that our weapons agreement with Britain has increased . . . the threat of a new war," by broadcasting warnings of devastating retaliation against the Netherlands, Britain and West Germany, by informing Denmark that it would be suicidal to permit use of her bases for atomic strikes against the USSR, by threatening Norway with a destructive blow, and by telling France and Israel that any attempt to defend the right of free passage through the Gulf of Aqaba by force would create an immediate risk of "broad military conflict." Against this background of threats and counter-threats, the search for some area of possible East-West agreement continues. In the opinion of Walter Lippmann, "the issue of war and peace will be decided primarily in Europe." Thus, he suggests, there must be a new diplomatic approach to an all-European settlement.

by WALTER LIPPMANN

No one, I think, not even at the top of affairs and therefore on the inside of all of the available information, can as yet see clearly, can as yet see as a whole, where we really are and where we ought to go.

Everyone knows, of course, that we are in a time of rapid, radical and complicated change. Now, in itself, change is far from being a new experience for the generation to which I belong. We have lived amidst great events for which we were unprepared. We have become involved in wars which we expected to stay out of. We have hoped great things from victory and we have never seen a good peace. But now, if I may put it that way, the world is changed for Americans, not only in the degree of our involvement with the outer world, but in the very kind of our involvement with the rest of the world.

Throughout the 19th Century, and during the two world wars of this century, we have thought that we were living in one world. We have thought that this world had its political center in the western society, the

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society which consists of Europe and the Americas, the society to which we belong.

Even the most anti-imperialistic among us has assumed this. We have supposed that all the nations—the old ones who were breaking with the past, the new ones who were emerging from colonial status—that all the nations would have the same fundamental political ideals which we have, not because they are our ideals but because these ideals are universal.

The greatest and most fundamental change of our time is that this picture of ourselves and of our place in the world and of our role in the history of mankind is no longer valid. The culture, the ideology of the western society is no longer recognized as universal. It is challenged as it has not been challenged since Christendom was challenged by the expansion of Islam.

The one world which we always have taken for granted in our thinking has been succeeded by many worlds. We now live amidst these many worlds. They compete with one another, they coexist with one another. They trade with one another and, in varying degrees, they co-operate with one another. This change from one world to several worlds is a deep change. It is a change not only in what we think about our foreign policy but in the very way that we have to think about it.

In our political thinking, that is to say in the thinking of the Western World, it is a change comparable with the change from the Ptolemaic to the Copernican astronomy, from the view that this earth is the center of the universe to the view that this earth is only a planet, a big planet no doubt, but still a planet in a much larger solar system. It is this new situation which we are trying to understand. It is in this new situation that we are trying to get our bearings and to feel our way forward.

But in order to do this, we must first look back and see how United States foreign policy was, until very recently, controlled by the underlying conception of the 19th Century—the conception of one world whose political center was in the North Atlantic region of the globe.

In the First World War we were drawn in when Britain and her ally, France, were threatened with defeat. We were no longer able to remain isolated from Europe and unentangled with the wars of Europe, as we had been during the 19th Century. But how were we drawn in the First World War? We were drawn in to reinforce Great Britain. We were the auxiliaries and the reserves. We called ourselves an associated power, and our troops fought in Europe under a supreme commander who was a French general and our Navy was under the overall command of the British admiralty.

When the war ended in 1918, we hoped and believed that we had won a victory for the idea that the principles and ideals of the Western society are universal. Woodrow Wilson proclaimed a world order. But it was a world order based on our Western principles and ideals. Moreover, it was to be an order in which the nations of the North Atlantic region would continue to be the political leaders of mankind.

On the surface, there was in 1918 much to justify this optimistic view. The North Atlantic community had won a smashing military victory, and the United States emerged as a new and powerful member of the Western society. Russia was still a primitive country in the throes of a deep social revolution. China was a feeble and backward country, divided up among foreign powers. India was still under British rule. North Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia were under British or French imperial dominion. On the surface, in Woodrow Wilson's time it looked as if Britain and France, reinforced by the United States and Canada, could prolong indefinitely the world order that had existed in the 19th Century.

We now know that this was a brilliant illusion. Both France and Britain were profoundly weakened by their fearful losses in the First World War. As representatives of the Western philosophy, they were challenged as imperialists over all Asia and Africa. We did not know this in 1918. We took it for granted that with American military and financial help the worldwide predominance of the Atlantic community would continue.

In the Second World War, the role played by the United States was no longer that of an associated power bringing up the reinforcements and the reserves. But before Pearl Harbor, and before we actually entered the Second World War, we still thought of ourselves in terms of World War I. We used to talk, you may remember, about aiding the Allies to defend America. In fact, however, it was soon plain that we must take up the whole burden of the war in the Pacific, including the defense of Australia and of New Zealand. In Europe, the French Army had been defeated and Great Britain was under violent assault and strained to the limit. We had not only to supply the weapons and other economic necessities, but we had to raise a great army ourselves.

The difference between the two world wars is marked by the fact that in the second, as distinguished from the first, the supreme commanders on sea and on land were Americans. Nevertheless, until World War II ended, we could still believe—perhaps I should say that we tried still to believe—that when Britain and France and Western Europe recovered from the damages of the war, the North Atlantic community would still be the political center of the world.

I venture to believe that in the last analysis this was the underlying assumption in the minds of both Churchill and Roosevelt at the close of the war. They believed that with Britain and America acting as partners, they could handle Russia and have the deciding voice in the postwar settlement. They were mistaken.

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The fact of the matter is that Churchill himself was so big that he made British power look bigger than it was. It soon appeared that Britain, though it was a great power by the old standards, was not like the United States and the USSR, a superpower. It was soon evident that in the postwar world the Atlantic community, with the British-American partnership at its core, was no longer the paramount power in the world.

We achieved our independence amidst the rivalry of the North Atlantic powers. We developed this continent in security behind the supremacy of the British powers. We fought the First World War as the auxiliary of the Atlantic powers. We fought the Second World War as the leading power of the Atlantic community. Now this is fundamentally altered.

The greatest powers with which we have to concern ourselves are no longer in the North Atlantic region. They are in eastern Europe and in Asia. While the welfare of the Atlantic community is a close and vital interest of the United States, the Atlantic community is no longer the political center of the world. We are living amidst the decline of Britain as one of the leading powers of the world, and we find ourselves without a powerful ally in the face of the new powers of eastern Europe and of Asia and of Africa.

To dramatize the rapid changes in the past 100 years, we might say that through most of the 19th Century the world capital was London. After the First World War, the world capitals were London and Washington. After the Second World War, the world capitals were Washington, Moscow, and London. Now the world capitals are Washington, Moscow, London, Peiping, Delhi, and, who knows, perhaps eventually, also Cairo.

We are in a wholly new situation. It is not a clearly visible situation with all its landmarks and features well defined. There are no reliable maps. This is, in part, because so much of the world is hidden by censorship and obscured by propaganda.

But another reason, and perhaps a more compelling reason, why there are no reliable maps is that so much of the world is in the midst of revolutionary changes of which we cannot foresee the outcome.

Nevertheless, we must try to find our bearings, to find out where we are and what is around us. And one way to do this is to look back and to remind ourselves where we came from and how we got where we are.

We must, I think, go back about 12 years to the winter of 1945 when Roosevelt and Churchill were on their way to Yalta in the Russian Crimea. The end of the world war was in sight. They were on their way to Yalta in order to negotiate with Stalin about the armistices which would end the fighting.

As we all know, they did not reach an agreement on what should be the terms of the peace treaties with the two powerful enemies they expected soon to defeat. But they did agree on the general terms of the armistices they expected to make with Germany and Japan.

I hope I can say what I have to say here about Yalta without entering into and stirring up again the furious controversy which has raged about it ever since. The point about which there cannot be serious dispute is that Yalta was followed in May by the German armistice and in August by the Japanese armistice.

Now an armistice is essentially an agreement, first to stop shooting, and then it is an agreement as to where the armed forces are to stand still. In substance, the armistices of 1945 reflected and registered the military situation as the Big Three at Yalta expected it would be when the fighting ended. The lines of the armistices of the Second World War are what we have since come to know as the line of the Iron Curtain. The Iron Curtain is where the Red Army settled down when the fighting stopped. This line still divides Germany. It still divides Europe. And in Asia the line which now divides the Communist from the non-Communist powers is essentially the line of the American occupation at the time of the ceasefire.

This, then, was the situation of the postwar world as it took shape from the armistice lines. Today we are living amidst the breakup and the disintegration of the postwar world. The question I should now like to discuss is how this disintegration started, and what caused this breakup.

As a result of the Yalta conference the world was divided into two great spheres of influence. In the one sphere, where the Soviet Union was supreme, Stalin tried to create a new Russian Empire. This empire was founded primarily on the power of the Red Army. In fact, the empire was the territory occupied by the Red army. Stalin's purpose was to make the people of Eastern Europe docile satellites or colonies of the new Russian Empire.

The other sphere comprised the rest of the world. It was an unorganized collection of old and new states. It consisted not only of Western Europe, Latin America, and the United States, but also of the old European empires, which then extended across North Africa, Egypt, and the Middle East through India and Southeast Asia to the Dutch Empire in Indonesia. In this sphere, the United States took the initiative in trying to make sure that the Soviet Union did not extend its empire.

As the principal military arm of the Communist sphere was the Red army, so the principal military arm of the non-Communist sphere was the United States Strategic Air Force equipped with atomic bombs.

This situation lasted until about 1950, as long as only the Soviets had an effective army and only the United States had the atomic bomb. In this uneasy balance of power, the Red army was supreme on the ground in all of Europe and Asia; the United States Strategic Air Force

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was supreme in the air over Europe and Asia. Each acted as a deterrent on the other. As against an invasion by the Red army, Western Europe was wholly defenseless. Yet the Red army did not and could not overrun Western Europe. It was contained because the Kremlin knew what the United States Air Force could do to Russian cities.

On the other hand, one might say vice versa, the United States was held in check by the Red army. Let me say a word about how we were held in check. The very highest American military authorities knew that if we struck at the Russian cities, the Red army, which was already in Eastern Europe, would overrun Western Europe. It would occupy the countries of Western Europe against which we could not use the atomic bomb, countries such as Western Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and France. When the Red army did that it would destroy the existing governments. It would liquidate the existing leaders in all classes and, before it could be forced to retire, it would probably destroy the big cities and the industrial plants of Western Europe.

This was the postwar stalemate, the Red army as against the atomic bomb.

THE breakup of the postwar world was fairly foreseeable as soon as this original postwar stalemate was broken. In September 1949, the Soviet Union set off an atomic bomb of its own. This event announced to the world that the American monopoly was over and that a situation, which was radically different from that of the postwar years, would now develop.

The breaking of the American monopoly meant the beginning of a race in nuclear armaments. This was a terrifying prospect. It set in motion a strong tendency towards disintegration inside both the Stalinist empire and inside the Western coalition.

Once it was evident that there were going to be two rival superpowers, each armed with nuclear weapons, the nations which had no nuclear weapons began to feel desperately insecure. They were in danger of being destroyed in a war that would be fought with weapons they themselves did not possess. They could not defend themselves against those weapons. They could not strike back. They were bound, therefore, to make it their central national purpose to stay out of a big war if, because of acts of criminal folly, a big war could not be prevented. It was under these conditions that what we call neutralism was born and soon began rapidly to spread.

If we say that at Yalta the postwar world was divided into two great spheres of influence, then I would say that when the race of nuclear armaments got underway—beginning in 1949 but rising to a climax with the hydrogen bomb—the two great spheres of influence began to disintegrate. No doubt there were other reasons. But the trigger which set the forces of disintegration in rapid motion in both spheres was the race of nuclear armaments. On both sides of the Iron Curtain the pent-up forces of nationalism were released. On our side of the Iron Curtain these forces invoked the slogan of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. On the other side of the Iron Curtain, they have been invoking the slogan of anti-Stalinism.

These upheavals have, of course, a long history. The liquidation of the western empires is one of the great historical phenomena of the 20th Century, and the national opposition by Hungarians and Poles to Russian domination began long ago in the past. But when the atomic race began in 1949, nationalism and neutralism became urgent and passionate because they offered a means of self-defense, and indeed a means of survival.

The terrifying destructiveness of the hydrogen bomb was demonstrated between November 1952, when we exploded ours, and August 1953, when the Soviets exploded theirs. Politically and psychologically, these gigantic explosions have jarred loose, they have dislocated and pulled apart, much of the political structure of the postwar world. The disintegration of the old European empires in Asia and Africa has been accelerated. The disintegration of the new Russian empire in Europe has been started. The structure of alliances on both sides of the Iron Curtain has begun to crumble.

IT WAS when he realized this, that President Eisenhower made his historic declaration that there is now no alternative to peace. The Russians had also realized what the revolution in military weapons meant. This common realization in Moscow and Washington led to the famous meeting at the summit, which took place in Geneva a year and a half ago, in July of 1955. At that meeting, Russia and the United States acknowledged publicly to each other and before the world that with the advent of the new weapons they could not, they would not, they dared not contemplate war.

At the time of the Geneva meeting, we were all aware that, beyond these mutual declarations against war, there were no serious agreements reached, or even brought any nearer, on any of the great practical issues of the time—on, for example, the reunification of the two Germanies, on the problem of the status of the satellites in Eastern Europe, on the future of the Middle East.

There is no way of telling whether or not the opportunity existed to go on from Geneva to settlements of some of these problems. If the opportunity existed, it was missed. On our side, the President fell ill and was unable for some time to take the initiative in foreign affairs. On the other side, the Russians stood pat and were unyielding. We do not know what might have been. But what has actually happened is that while we have come no nearer to settlements in Europe, in the Middle East and in the Far East, there has been a rapid disintegration of empires and of alliances.

We can see what has happened to the French in North Africa and the British in the Middle East. We know from

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what has happened in Poland and in Hungary that the Soviet empire in eastern Europe is undermined, and that the Soviet military system, which is known as the Warsaw Pact, is profoundly affected. We know that if NATO is going to survive, it is going to have a very different future from what we expected.

A few months ago, at the end of October, the course of events, which I have been describing, burst into violence. It is a remarkable fact, which historians will long be studying and trying to explain, that the explosion in Hungary and the explosion in Egypt took place at approximately the same time. The fact that the two explosions came so very close together may not have been a mere accident. It may well be that the Israeli Government decided to strike when it saw that the Soviet Union was deeply entangled by the rebellion in Hungary. But the two explosions would not have happened if both in Eastern Europe and in the Middle East the situation had not become explosive. These two explosions marked the disintegration of the postwar world.

You will want me to say before I conclude what I see emerging from all this. This is not so easy, and no doubt I am foolish to try. But here at least are some of the things I see coming out of it.

There will remain the fundamental stalemate between the Soviet Union and the United States, the stalemate which was recognized by the President and the Soviet leaders at Geneva in 1955.

In all probability, neither of the superpowers will decide deliberately to make war against the other. On the other hand, both in Europe and in the Middle East, there are very grave issues which, if they cannot be settled by negotiation, may burst into violence. They may become uncontrollable, and they could involve Russia and America in a war they are both trying to avoid.

In Europe the question is whether the Soviet empire can be liquidated in a peaceable and orderly way. If it is not, we must be prepared to see the kind of thing that has happened in Hungary spread to Eastern Germany. If there is armed rebellion in Eastern Germany and the Red Army is used to suppress it, there is little likelihood that the West Germans will sit quietly on the sidelines. They will almost certainly join in, perhaps not officially at first, but as volunteers, and this will put the American and the British Armies in Western Germany in a very dangerous predicament. For one could hardly expect the Russians to leave West Germany alone if it becomes the base of a rebellion in Eastern Germany. All of this could readily enough lead to a world war.

The supreme question is whether we can, by a great effort of statesmanship, negotiate a settlement which averts these dangers. I am not saying that we can. But at least one can imagine such a settlement. It will have to be a settlement negotiated by the Western Powers with the Soviet Union and ratified by the two Germanies. It will have to provide for the reunification of the two Germanies. It will have to provide for the gradual but nevertheless definite evacuation of the European Continent up to the Soviet frontier by the Red Army in the east, and by the British and American Armies in the west. Only in this way can Poland, Hungary, and the other satellites be liberated.

But that will not be enough. The withdrawal of the armies, the unification of Germany, the liberation of the satellites will be possible, will be conceivable—only if we can construct by negotiation an all-European security system which is underwritten by the Soviet Union and the United States. It will have to be a system which guarantees the European nations among themselves, and particularly against a revived and reunited Germany. It will have to be a system which guarantees all of Europe against Russia, and it will have to be one which guarantees Russia against Europe. Within such a European system there ought to develop an all-European economy, and beyond that—on the far horizons of hope—the prospect of a European political confederation.

In my view the issue of war and peace will be decided primarily in Europe, and, so to speak, along the line of Iron Curtain. The greatest question in the world is whether Europe can cease to be divided and can become united by negotiation and peaceable means.

I would go so far as to say that if we could engage the Russians in a serious negotiation which looked to a general European settlement, the problem of the Middle East would become—I won't say soluble—but manageable. I say this because Russia is not vitally interested in the Middle East. She does not need the oil, and she cannot be invaded from the Middle East. Russia is, however, vitally interested in Europe, particularly in Germany and in Poland, and it is there in Europe that we must make a settlement or live in continual danger of a gigantic war.

When I look into the future I think of this country as having two great missions to perform. The one is to bring about the European settlement I have just been describing. On this, as I have just said, depends the issue of peace or war. From such a settlement would come a new Europe, a Europe which had lost its empires overseas but had found a new strength, security, and prosperity in its own unity. Our other mission is, I firmly believe, to work out a new relationship between the Western nations and the newly emancipated peoples of Africa and Asia. The imperial and colonial age is over. The age which is to follow is only in its dim beginnings, and it is our mission to play a leading part in working out the terms on which the peoples of the East and the peoples of the West can live side by side in confidence, in security, and in mutual respect.

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Consider The Negro Teacher

by NICK AARON FORD

SINCE the Supreme Court's decision three years ago outlawing racial segregation in the public schools, much sympathy has been expended on the "victims" of the Court order. Some have said that the worst sufferers from this "monstrous" deed are white parents who from birth have known only "white superiority," who have never doubted the reality of the stereotype of Negro crap-shooters, razor-wielders, sex fiends or superstitious clowns. We are asked to picture these parents dying a thousand deaths each morning as their children trudge off to school where a few black students may be cowering on the grounds and in the buildings.

Others may suggest that it is the white children who are most to be pitied. For are not these youngsters being forced to listen to the incorrect (or worse) language of Negro pupils, and are they not at the impressionable age when they will imitate the bad habits of Negro schoolmates—and at the same time voluntarily form close friendships with them?

There are those, too, who are sure that the Court's decision has been hardest on Negro parents—parents who have learned through bitter experiences of unemployment, economic reprisals and brutality to accept their status as "inferiors," parents who feel more at ease living in black ghettos and moving among people who have at least an understanding of their unrealized dreams, parents who live with fear as their children leave home each morning to sit in classrooms and play during recess with the sons and daughters of white supremacists.

I have also heard it said that the Negro children themselves are the real martyrs in this de-segregation struggle. Suddenly lifted from a school situation of mutual respect and cordiality where they were encouraged to join wholeheartedly in every kind of extracurricular activity, they now are thrust into an electric atmosphere; their talents are rejected everywhere outside the classroom; and, at the same time, they are expected to perform at the level of the best of their classmates. When some of them fail miserably, all of them are condemned as poor educational risks. When some of them fight back when jeered by mobs, all of them are classed as juvenile delinquents. When some of them make high grades, they are considered unrepresentative of their race. When they form little groups of their own for study or for play, they are accused of preferring segregation to integration. When they actively seek comradeship among their white fellow-students, they are charged with forcing "social equality."

And what of the white teacher? If education is problem-solving, here indeed—in the new relationships that must follow in the wake of the Court decree—is a problem to be solved. But might it not be difficult for an intelligent white teacher of social studies to read the Declaration of Independence with a straight face when he knows some children who are looking up at him would be beaten severely should they insist on the Declaration's full and prompt implementation? It would be equally painful for such a teacher to read and interpret the Constitution of the United States to a mixed class when he knows that the parents of some of his students have been assaulted, even killed, for attempting to exercise the right to vote. Furthermore, if there is such a vast difference between the rate of learning and the quality of academic achievement of white and Negro children because of race (as a small minority of psychologists contend), must there not be an *Educational Psychology for Negroes* and a manual on *Methods of Teaching Arithmetic to Negro Children,* and how can the harassed teacher master all the new pedagogical texts necessary to make him understand how to teach the two Negro children in his class of 35 and carry on his regular class schedule at the same time?

BUT the individual whose dilemma concerns me most, because I know him best, is the Negro teacher. In many sections of the South, he faces the choice of swearing *opposition* to the Constitution of the United States and thereby retaining his job, or swearing *allegiance* to the Constitution and losing his job. Last summer, 17 teachers in one Southern state showed me contracts they were given which required that they sign affidavits swearing their opposition to integration in public schools and affirming their disinterest in teaching in an integrated situation. In another state, I was shown contracts for Negro teachers which were subject to cancellation or renewal at the end of each 30-day period, depending upon the conduct of the signer. Since some of the teachers had satisfactorily held their positions for as long as 20 years, it seemed obvious that "conduct" referred specifically to attitudes toward integration.

The dilemma of the Negro teacher is not due wholly to integration. Under the "separate but equal" doctrine which antedated the Supreme Court decision of May 17, 1954, other contradictions had to be endured. A former Negro colleague of mine, who had been principal of a

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rural high school for 11 years, was awarded the degree of Masters of Arts after many summers of study at a Western university. Upon his return from the graduating exercises, the county superintendent of education called him in to inform him that his contract would not be renewed for the next year. He was assured that his work had been eminently satisfactory, but unfortunately his M.A. degree plus his 11 years of teaching entitled him under state law to a salary higher than that of the white high school principal who had no graduate degree. And since the county authorities had no intention of paying a Negro more than a white man occupying a similar position, the only alternative was to secure another Negro principal with less training and no tenure.

BUT although the threat to the Negro teacher's professional security is serious, the undermining of his morale is catastrophic. Some Negroes in all occupations have resigned themselves to martyrdom. They defy all demands to compromise their principles or suppress their opinions, even though such defiance may mean hardship for themselves and their families. But the vast majority of peace-loving and law-abiding Negroes avoid the hero's lonely stand. Like their white counterparts, they will fight for their rights if they must, but they are prepared to pay for peace and comfort with outward conformity. Many will sign contracts with affidavits opposing integration, while in the silence of their souls they will shout, "Down with segregation!"

Not only is the Negro teacher's livelihood jeopardized, but his intellectual competence is questioned as well. He may attend the same graduate schools as his white colleagues and receive the same degrees based on the same requirements, but in the push toward integration he is usually referred to as an inferior teacher. Part of the very evidence which helped to destroy the "separate but equal" doctrine rests on the assumption that a school with an all-Negro faculty, even though the buildings and equipment may be superior, does not provide an education equal to that provided by an all-white faculty. Any school with an all-Negro faculty and an all-Negro student body is classified as inferior; white schools with all-white faculties are never thus classified, except on the basis of such criteria as buildings and equipment.

The fact is that in several large cities in the South, the average Negro teacher has more academic training and more tenure than his white colleague, which is not surprising since white college graduates have a far larger assortment of occupations open to them at higher salaries than do Negroes. And since the teaching profession represents for the Negro one of the highest paid white collar occupations available, once a Negro qualifies for a teaching position he generally remains until retirement—improving his status and salary by periodic attendance at summer school.

Finally, although the Negro teacher knows there is no

Photo: Gertrude Samuels, The New York Times

fate more bleak than a loss of faith in the only political doctrine that guarantees freedom and equality for all, the application of this doctrine is so half-hearted in many sections that his hope drains away. He knows democracy means equal opportunities for employment based on merit alone, but he sees teaching positions go begging in the South and in the North while thousands of his race with first-class teaching certificates are forced to take menial jobs in domestic service because boards of education will not even examine their applications and educational credentials. In cities which have already accepted the principle of integration, brilliant and experienced Negro teachers are passed over when promotions open up.

I dwell on the problems of the Negro teacher because it seems to me so evident that the survival of America as a free and responsible nation depends so largely on the devotion and moral integrity of our teachers. Any deprivation which encourages despair, which robs educators of their dignity, self-respect and chance for advancement robs the whole nation. Unless we are resolved to apply the teachings of our democratic tradition to teachers, what hope is there that the next generation of Americans will understand and deeply care about the decencies that make America worth saving?

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BOOKS & COMMENT

As Nasser Sees Himself

by Richard Dudman

ONE of Gamal Abdel Nasser's warmest admirers has laid bare the Egyptian president's dream of empire in far more convincing terms than those dreams could have been described by Nasser's bitterest enemy.

Gerald Sparrow's new book, *The Sphinx Awakes,* published in London, reveals the author's scant knowledge of the rest of the Middle East. At the same time, it shows he listened closely to everything he was told when he visited Egypt for several months last year.

Sparrow says in so many words that Nasser hopes and plans to rule a nation that would include Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the Arabian Sheikhdoms, Libya, Morocco, Algeria, the Sudan, and even two non-Arab countries, Iran and Pakistan.

The Sphinx Awakes, by Gerald Sparrow (Robert Hale: London; 21/-).

This retired British lawyer, who spent much of his career in Bangkok, obviously is in full sympathy with the "Arab Commonwealth Vision," as he calls it. On his visit to Egypt, he consulted, as he acknowledges, mainly Egyptian sources. He talked extensively with the bureaucrats in the 10-story building in Cairo occupied by the Information Administration of the Ministry of National Guidance and appears to have taken at face value everything he was told there.

His limitations are a part of his strength. He assumes that the religious ties of Islam and the racial ties of Pan-Arabism would be enough to draw the whole mishmash of Middle East states together. He seems oblivious of the formidable economic, political and dynastic rivalries that keep pulling them apart. He seems unaware that Iraq and other Arab states that are blessed with oil resources doubtless would see the Nasser dream as a scheme to dilute Egypt's poverty and unemployment by amalgamation with its Arab neighbors and at the same time obtain an interest in their oil wealth.

As a consequence of this narrowness of view, Sparrow has been thoroughly persuaded of Nasser's sincerity, vision and capability. And *The Sphinx Awakes* appears to be an accurate picture of just what Nasser and the group surrounding him have in mind. (I checked this conclusion recently by showing key portions of the book to officials at the Information Administration in Cairo. They said they considered it a fair report.)

Describing "The Arab Commonwealth Vision," Sparrow writes:

> It is a plan to unite under one flag the Arab world now scattered and dispersed into a number of small, comparatively weak nations, most of whom, like Syria and Pakistan, have only recently received their freedom. . . .
>
> If Nasser's dream comes true—and his dreams often do—he would be the political leader of a new force in world affairs, of a rich, powerful Middle Eastern Arab world with the closest ties, religious, commercial, strategic and linguistic. Moreover, Egypt's economic problem, an expanding population in a contracting world cotton market, would not be insuperable, as it now sometimes appears to be.

Running down the list of prospective members of the envisioned Egyptian-led Commonwealth, Sparrow calls Syria "an ally ripe for the choosing" and says Moslem ties with Pakistan must sooner or later "achieve a resulting unity." He observes that Iraq can shake off British influence and look to Egypt for its security, adding: "The further we look at Iraq, the more neatly she seems to fit into the picture."

Of Iran (Persia), Sparrow says Nasser sees "in the Persian relationship with the West, and in her treaty obligations, just that combination of power politics and interference in Arab affairs by the West that he dislikes. But he does not despair. He waits for the Persian climate to change. For Persia, he would say, has her real links with her Arab neighbors and friends."

Africa gets this mention:

> In Libya, Morocco and Algeria (as well as to some extent in Nigeria, Madagascar and Zanzibar), Arabic is the common tongue, Islam the binding faith. There is no doubt that the Egyptian government fosters and befriends all movements in these states towards breaking British and French ties. . . .
>
> Over these desert lands, with their great life-giving rivers, the flag of Britain and the flag of France flew in assured dominion. It may not be far-fetched to prophesy that in the not too distant future a new flag will fly there. It will be the flag of the Arab Federation: the green crescent flag of a United Islam making the prophet's dream come true.

The Egyptian flag fits this description. It is green with white crescent and three stars.

IF Sparrow sees Arab nationalism entirely from an Egyptian viewpoint, he also sees only one side of the Arab-Israel dispute. He reports that officials at the Ministry of National Guidance told him on his first day in Cairo. "We are at war with Israel. We always shall be." Sparrow observes that this statement "contains the naked truth." He goes on to give the Arab version of the exodus of the Palestine Arab refugees in 1948, that they fled in fully justified fear of their lives, overlooking entirely the documented Israeli version, that the refugees were urged by Arab propaganda broadcasts to leave on the assurance they could return a few weeks later after victorious Arab armies had driven the Jews into the sea.

"Egypt may have, expediently, to bow to United Nations pressure and, from time to time, shelve her vendetta, but she will never drop it," Sparrow writes. "Nor will the Arab League tolerate the State of Israel indefinitely. The wrongs done to the Arab world by the new state are too terrible, too numerous, to be either forgotten or forgiven."

He makes no bones about predicting an Arab war of extermination against Israel. In doing so, he repeats the propaganda line of the Arab radio, uninhibited by the sophistication that leads Nasser and his associates to adopt a

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more reasonable, tolerant line when discussing Israel with Western newsmen and diplomats.

"Whatever I now read in the newspapers, whatever the United Nations reports say, I know that Egypt and her allies will, some day go to war with Israel," he writes. "Their object is to blot out the State of Israel, which, to them, seems a monstrous creation."

Sparrow's conclusion that Egyptian hatred is a product of "Jewish barbarity towards the Arab, not prejudice against the Jews as such," rests on his observation that the large Jewish population was living in peace and friendship with its Egyptian neighbors, "free to pursue their own way of life, including their faith, their work and the enrichment of themselves if they can."

Unfortunately, events caught up with him. The book was written only a short time before Egypt reacted to the Israeli invasion by undertaking a campaign to drive all Jews from the country.

Events caught up with Sparrow in another respect, also. The Sinai war provided a prompt test of his appraisal of the Egyptian army. In the book, he lauded its leadership and organization and called it "capable of defending the country or of resisting any eventual danger of aggression by Israel." Shortly after he wrote those words, Egyptian soldiers in the Sinai desert were throwing away their boots so they could flee faster from the advancing Israelis, and Nasser's officers in Gaza were begging an American colonel in command of United Nations forces to protect them from the invaders.

Nasser's own little book, *Egypt's Liberation: The Philosophy of the Revolution,* which enjoyed a sudden vogue last summer after his seizure of the Suez Canal, drew the broad outlines of his dream of the future, built on a community of Arab nations, control of strategic lines of communication and a monopoly on Middle East oil. The details now have been filled in by *The Sphinx Awakes.*

Anthony West as a Critic

by Donald Malcolm

It is impossible not to admire the erudition of Anthony West. There is something unspeakably gorgeous about his casual manner of working out-of-the-way information into the body of his discussion. What other reviewer, for instance, could have managed to find the publication of Robert Graves' *The Greek Myths* "a little untimely" because it came "a year too early to celebrate the four hundredth anniversary of the appearance of Vincenzo Cartari's *Images*

Principles & Persuasions, the literary essays of Anthony West (Harcourt, Brace; $4.50).

of the Gods"? Take a moment and consider that comment from every side, whisper it over to yourself, and you will find that it just about bangs everything in the way of graceful learning. One imagines Mr. West murmuring, "Oh that's nothing, I can say that kind of thing any time I want to."

And he can, too. In an essay on Alfred de Vigny, he quotes from a letter sent to Tennyson by a manufacturer of barbed wire. In an essay on Monckton Milnes, he explains that a man named Fred Hankey was not really a sadist, although the Goncourt brothers thought he was, and so did "the famous English collector" of pornography, Henry Spencer Ashbee. In fact, he was "a vegetarian all his life because he could not bear the cruelty of butchering animals." One's wonderment grows. An essay on Charles Dickens unearths "a fiendish device called Captain Maconochie's Mark System," which figures in Dickens'

> . . . interventions in the managements of a home for fallen women financed by Miss Burdett-Coutts.
>
> Miss *Angela* Burdett-Coutts.

Mr. West's erudition is as deep as it is broad. In order to correct the prevalent notion that Charles Evans Hughes was ultra-conservative in bias, he points out that the true, liberal line of Hughes thought

> . . . is most clearly shown . . . in the hundred-page majority opinion he wrote in the Minnesota rate cases and the majority opinion he wrote in the Shreveport case. They are without color and drama, being complex definitions of the powers of the Interstate Commerce Commission to regulate railway tariffs, but they are, nonetheless, vital episodes in a social revolution.

Observe. From the whole body of Hughes' work, Mr. West was able to pluck out the two writings which reveal the kernel of the jurist's thought. This strongly argues a total and intimate acquaintance with everything Hughes has written. Those who come to a contrary conclusion, that Mr. West has merely borrowed this opinion from the volume he was reviewing or some such source, may easily be silenced by having it pointed out to them that Mr. West does not acknowledge anything of the kind. In fact, after remarking in the first sentence of his review that the book was "written with a noticeable lack of literary grace," he never alluded to it again.

Mr. West is not always so terse in his analysis of the books that fall into his hands for review, but generally he does not lavish many words on them. Occasionally, one gets the impression that the chief purpose of the author's toil is to stimulate the flow of Mr. West's mental juices. There is nothing especially reprehensible in this, since it injures nobody but the author in question. Any reader who is stiffly determined to find out what the author actually says can always consult the reviewers of *The New York Times Book Section,* who are seldom good for anything else.

Anyhow, Mr. West's critical method, as stated in the introduction to *Principles & Persuasions,* would seem to call for discursiveness. He sides with Johnson in the belief that the primary function of literature is to teach a knowledge of life, and goes on to remark:

> The extent to which a writer will evade the realities of his relationships, and fudge and dodge facts in presenting himself to the world, gives one a good measure of his integrity. The falsifications he indulges in while fabricating the persona he presents for public consumption generally show up in his books as falsities, and if one is aware of the deliberate or compulsive distortions that shape his life one is the better equipped to judge by how much his work is a contribution to knowledge, and by how much it is a simple reflection of his psychological necessities.

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There are many advantages, from a reviewer's point of view, in Mr. West's way of doing business, but the undoubted chief is the ease with which a critic can prove a writer to be suffering from "compulsive distortions." Consider the symptoms Mr. West was able to extract from George Orwell's brief account of feeding a gazelle. Here is what Orwell wrote:

> Though it took the piece of bread I was holding out it obviously did not like me. It nibbled rapidly at the bread, then lowered its head and tried to butt me, then took another nibble and then butted again. Probably its idea was that if it could drive me away the bread would somehow remain hanging in mid-air.

And here is Mr. West's diagnosis:

> Orwell cannot, or will not, remember that while they are sucklings the young of all such creatures butt their mothers as a signal to let down their milk, and form a habit that they tend to repeat when hand-fed with anything they like. . . . It is anything but a gesture of dislike. But then, there is nothing in the realm of common or uncommon experience that Orwell cannot stand on its head and interpret in a negative and essentially paranoid sense.

MR. WEST insists, you observe, that Orwell "cannot, or will not, *remember*." Thus he neatly skirts the possibility that Orwell simply never acquired this particular item of mammillary lore (and there actually are people so ignorant; I am one of them myself). To ferret out mental diseases in this manner doubtless requires a certain knack, but the *New Yorker* critic has it, and to spare. Indeed, the author who can prove his grasp of reality to Mr. West's entire satisfaction is a somewhat rare bird. Among those who fail to make the grade are Charles Dickens, who had an "obsessive hunger" for popularity; George Eliot, whose writing concealed a morally unhealthy personality; Emile Zola, whose "private neurosis" took the form of "a terror of life and a sour envy of those with the courage to live it"; George Orwell, who suffered from a "hidden wound"; and Francois Mauriac, whose "loathing of the feminine principle . . . seems to express a loathing of life itself."

Once he has completed his exploration of an author's subconscious mind, Mr. West generally makes short work of the poor nut's pretensions to significance. His method is impressive. Let us return to his essay on Orwell and watch him at work.

THE STAB that produced the hidden wound in Orwell's psyche, according to Mr. West, was delivered during the author's unhappy school days at Crossgates. In his essay, "Such, Such Were the Joys," Orwell describes how, as the son of poor parents, he had suffered from middle-class snobbery. By relying on his instinct for diagnosis and ignoring all evidence to the contrary, Mr. West is able to conclude from this that

> . . . the hurt child's feeling that money is the measure of all things . . . is treated as the final truth about the adult world in both *Down and Out in Paris and London* and *Keep the Aspidistra Flying*.

Turning next to *Coming Up for Air*, Mr. West points to several passages that anticipate the Second World War as evidence that Orwell's mind was "warming to the idea of a universal smashup," which would "destroy the whole world of money values, in which he felt himself inadequate." But when the war came, this world remained fairly intact, and

> . . . It would be unfair, perhaps, to say that Orwell was disappointed, but at any rate he felt cheated. Like a number of other writers who had thought themselves ill-used by prewar society and had been unconsciously looking forward to Armageddon and social shipwreck, he consoled himself by constructing a fantasy of universal ruin.

Here we may pause to note that Mr. West's knowledge of Orwell's unconscious mind appears vastly superior to Orwell's own. Orwell's *conscious* mind wrote the following, during the bombings in 1941:

> In whatever shape England emerges from the war, it will be deeply tinged with the characteristics I have spoken of earlier. The intellectuals who hope to see it Russianized or Germanized will be disappointed. The gentleness, the hypocrisy, the thoughtlessness, the reverence for law, and the hatred of uniforms will remain, along with the suet puddings and the misty skies. It needs some very great disaster, such as prolonged subjugation by a foreign enemy, to destroy a national culture. . . . England will still be England, an everlasting animal stretching into the future and the past, and, like all living things, having the power to change out of recognition and yet remain the same.

You see, he did not realize that, deep down, he was yearning for Armageddon and social shipwreck. It requires a critic to speak for an author's subconscious mind.

Having proved to his own satisfaction that Orwell was deranged, and consequently not a trustworthy observer of politics and society, Mr. West feels free to examine *Nineteen Eighty-Four* exclusively in terms of Orwell's "psychological necessities." It is the gazelle business again, but on a larger scale. The question as to whether or not Orwell succeeded in his attempt to render the essential qualities of totalitarianism simply never comes up. Thus, "Big Brother, the feared dictator whom everyone pretends to love, is really Bingo, the headmaster's wife." Orwell may have had the delusion that he was writing a political novel, but Mr. West knows better:

> Whether he knew it or not, what he did in *Nineteen Eighty-Four* was to send everybody in England to an enormous Crossgates to be as miserable as he had been.

Or, to state the argument in terms of Mr. West's critical program, Orwell's "psychological necessities" compelled him to write *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. It is not a genuine "contribution to knowledge" because the totalitarian state never came to pass in England (with the implication that if it never came to pass in England, it can only have existed in Orwell's mind). Therefore, the explanation of *Nineteen Eighty-Four* must be sought in Orwell's unhappy childhood. Thus, by a beautiful and simple process, Mr. West demonstrates that Hitler, Stalin and the police state were all figments of Orwell's diseased imagination.

ALL THINGS considered, it does seem to me that Mr. West's critical approach—the analysis of literature in terms of the "psychological necessities" of authors—is a dubious one. Everyone must cope with psychological necessities of one sort or another, but only George Orwell wrote *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. It is nice to know that Dickens had an "obsessive hunger" for applause, but that does not tell us why we read Dickens. Obsessions in themselves do not create works

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of art, and in getting at "the man behind the writer," we risk losing sight of his qualities *as* a writer. If Dickens or Zola or Eliot had not produced novels of importance, who would care about their obsessions? Why then should we equate their obsessions with their art? These questions would bear asking, I think, even if literary psychoanalysis were as exact a science as Mr. West appears to believe. At its present stage of development, however, if this collection is any indication, it appears to be a highly conjectural and almost unscrupulous pursuit.

The Mirror of Mr. Dulles

by Frederic W. Collins

It is a strange and unfortunate thing that John Foster Dulles, who has such a strong sense of history and of his place in it, cannot wait for it. He must rush forth (much more than half way) to meet and treat with Clio as if she were a Ruritanian foreign secretary caught in a crisis of confidence about the American Secretary of State. He makes his latest excursion as a passenger (and at least co-pilot) in a biography by John Robinson Beal, of Henry Luce's Washington staff, which if it was not authorized was certainly not in any way discouraged. His anxiety leads Mr. Dulles to self-defeat, on terms summed up this way: If he is as good as this book says he is, he deserves a better book than this.

John Foster Dulles, by John Robinson Beal (Harper; $4.50).

This kind of a work should be done only by someone with a historian's disposition, including a disposition to objectivity, and a historian's time, typographical space, and tools. Almost any of the episodes dealt with merits much greater amplification and much, much greater documentation. Those being lacking, the author must resort to assertion.

In respect to several of the items piled haphazard in this particular kitchen sink there have been careful, extensive, and detailed examinations in the daily press. The tortured course of American policy and action in the Indo-China crisis is a first-class example. This is a case where what Mr. Beal would surely call uninformed critics are, providing they read the newspapers, in a better position to judge than are any who must depend on Mr. Beal's biography. Given Mr. Dulles' talent for *ex post facto* rationalization of his actions, and for floating his rationales in the channels of communication, it can be seen that in terms of history, the subject in this case, instead of being the best source of "the facts," is actually among the worst. Add Mr. Beal's almost wholly uncritical approach, and the best left to say about the book is that it may start arguments leading eventually to a valid appraisal of Mr. Dulles.

Having observed the hero and his modes of operation, I believe unreservedly that Mr. Dulles has full responsibility for this book, as if he had written it. So many of its essentials are Dulles and pure Dulles that the book may be regarded as a collection of notes, or even a mock-up, for an autobiography he has not yet whipped into shape. Those who are interested in American foreign policy should, of course, read it. They may not find out much about that policy and how it is made, but they will find out much about Mr. Dulles and how he is made, information relevant to their primary interest.

The title itself, and how it came to be what it is, tells a lot about Mr. Dulles. The book was advertised to the trade for publication in January, and was to have been called *The Peacemaker.* The events in Egypt and Hungary last fall caused publication to be postponed for updating of the material, and raised understandable doubts in the minds of Harper & Brothers about the title. The subject was broached to Mr. Dulles while he was recovering from his operation. He still thought the title was fine. Harper's stood on its second thoughts. The title is *John Foster Dulles: A Biography,* and the original title has shrunk to a heading for the last chapter.

Although efforts are made in the book to present Mr. Dulles as a regular fellow, his estimate of himself is not consistent

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with the wry awareness most humans have of their own shortcomings, and this lack of perspective may be one of his gravest faults. The man who once volunteered to Congress that "peace is my passion" began to feel in the late thirties, in his own fifties, and at page 86-87, that "he had neglected the potential for moral development implanted in him by his religious upbringing." He got the idea he was concentrating too much on "making money" and not enough on "public service." When he was on a perilous flight in China, his "uppermost thought" was that if he crashed, he couldn't finish *War, Peace and Change*. He convinced himself a little later that the effort "to create conditions favoring peace could not go forward without the moral dynamism potential in the man of religion." These evaluations could have come only from Mr. Dulles.

THE natural consequence of self-righteousness is impatience of others. On taking office as Secretary, Mr. Dulles found George Kennan's "frame of mind" to be of "little use" in the new scheme of things (Mr. Beal's language). There are comparable observations about allied statesmen which are not going to fit in very well, in personal relationships, with his role as peacemaker. But he is capable of massive benevolence, possessing, among other godly qualities, "a tolerance of and patience with France" not shown by all lesser mortals.

He is almost never at fault. His son, Avery, was "doing the piloting" when, with the future Secretary at the wheel, their yawl hit a rock and almost foundered. Herbert Hoover, Jr. is blamed for this government's bloopers on the tank shipment to Saudi Arabia and an erroneous initial reaction to a proffer of parley from Chou En-lai, although actually Mr. Hoover just happened to be at the wheel while Mr. Dulles was doing the piloting.

Mr. Beal faithfully reports that Mr. Dulles viewed a suggestion that Chiang relinquish Quemoy and Matsu to Red China as smacking "of the same kind of appeasement employed at Munich when the Sudetenland was awarded to Hitler." And the decision to enter Korea was "simple by comparison" with the decision to oppose the British and French action in Egypt.

Mr. Beal, also slides some comments of his own in to show where his heart lies. The United States, we find, "permitted China to slip from its side into Communist alliance." When Mr. Dulles "noted, however, that Congress could not 'impose' foreign policy on an administration unwilling to carry it out," Mr. Beal remarks that "this was precisely the case with the Truman administration as to China policy." Great Britain "prematurely" recognized Red China. Truman administration policy officially "remained one of indifference" until Korea. Unhappily for the reader, "the influences at work on American policy makers to bring about the final downfall of Chiang, or at least US recognition of the Peking government, form too complex a story for recounting here." The interested reader could get in touch with Senator McCarthy.

The reason Dulles is always right is simple: Anyone who disagrees with him is, in Mr. Beal's view of things, badly informed and probably an intellectual or something. This includes journalists and Democrats. Take Washington's diplomatic correspondents and commentators: "Being employed to report on America's impact abroad, they tend to gauge American moves by foreign reaction and to subordinate or overlook the test of American self-interest"—the doggonedest description of the boys on the State Department beat. Mr. Dulles' evaluation of Chiang as a sincere patriot "proved positively shocking to some of his intellectual acquaintances, who felt qualified to make strongly emotional judgments on the basis of what they read without satisfying themselves as to the factual bases of them."

CRITICS are people who point problems out without coping with them, and Columnist Joseph Alsop and Eric Sevareid are belabored at length. When Mr. Hoover instead of Mr. Dulles goofed, "in the sputterings of the more rabid critics there was unconsciously satiric reflection of their frustration at not being able to alight on their usual victim." The brink interview in *Life* brought attacks from "partisan critics and people who do not read beyond the headlines," a double-barreled confession about *Life's* headlines and the perseverances of its readers. The triumph of deterrence at Formosa was, among other things, "an indication that the well-meaning amateurs don't always know what they are talking about."

Despite Mr. Beal's persistently iconstructive (Luceword) approach, the book permits one to wonder a bit about Mr. Dulles. Did a youthful experience as secretary to the Chinese delegation at the Hague in 1907 (which becomes, in his official biography, Secretary of the Hague Peace Conference), and work on the finite subject of German reparations and Polish monetary stabilization, really represent the saturation in diplomacy Dulles is always said to have? (The Polish experience in 1927 has not brought success in a repetitive undertaking with a Polish delegation just now in Washington). One wonders where Mr. Dulles was in the fateful decade 1931-1941, the biography being largely silent on that. One notes that it was Lester Pearson, not Mr. Dulles, who fathered the UNEF in the Egyptian crisis, that it was Anthony Eden, not Mr. Dulles, who propelled Western European Union toward such military reality as it now has, that the Soviet had its own reasons for its sudden willingness to settle with Austria and get out, that Mr. Dulles certainly had a much more vigorous concept of liberation, despite Mr. Beal's agonizing reappraisal, than he has ever been able to give effect to or would now admit to, and that it has come almost full circle back to the "containment" of George Kennan, who couldn't stay on because he had the wrong attitude. One wonders, too, whether Formosa may not drop into Red Chinese hands without war, and what Mr. Dulles proposes to do about that.

ONE wonders, indeed, whether a passion for peace, and diligence in writing out one's thoughts about the problem of peaceful change, are enough material out of which to make a Secretary of State or a foreign policy. One wonders if this is not a philosophy, rather than a homogeneous foreign policy, that we are looking at and whether it is not great skill in argumentation in *ad hoc* situations, rather than diplomacy, which dominates in the performance.

Notes on Contributors

RICHARD DUDMAN, a reporter for *The St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, has just returned from a tour of the Middle East. FREDERIC W. COLLINS is Washington correspondent of *The Providence Journal*. NORMAN PODHORETZ is an editor of *Commentary*.

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PAPERBACK BOOKS

Religion, Rationalism, and Revolution

We have been so inundated with apocalypse, Original Sin, and the Fate of Modern Man by the paperbacks that it comes as an immense relief to open a soft-cover book and find the very value of religion—not to mention its truth—called into question. *The Future of an Illusion* (Anchor), written in 1927, is certainly not Freud's greatest speculative work: compared to, say *Civilization and its Discontents* it seems thin and almost simple-minded. Nor is it a profound study of the psychology of religion. William James' *The Varieties of Religious Experience,* which proceeds on the assumption that the validity and psychological value of religious *experience* have nothing to do with the truth of religious *doctrines,* gives a much better account of the phenomenological richness of the religious life than Freud does in this little book, where belief in God is uncompromisingly regarded as an infantile wish-fulfillment. But Freud's refusal to make any concession to religion—his insistence that the ultimate psychological value of all beliefs depends on their truth or falsity, his conviction that in the end human beings are better served by a disturbing truth than a consoling illusion—is precisely what gives the book such enormous relevance today. Read as a declaration of faith in the triumph of reason over instinct, as a polemic against the confusions and contradictions of religious apologetics, it is a moving and powerful work.

Here is what Freud has to say about the argument that man cannot face the "cruelty of reality" without religion—an argument that in various sophisticated guises has become very popular in contemporary theological discourse:

> Certainly this is true of the man into whom you have instilled the sweet—or bitter-sweet — poison from childhood on. But what of the other, who has been brought up soberly? Perhaps he, not suffering from neurosis, will need no intoxicant to deaden it. True, man will then find himself in a difficult situation. He will have to confess his utter helplessness and his insignificant part in the working of the universe; he will have to confess that he is . . . no longer the object of the tender care of a benevolent providence. He will be in the same position as the child who has left the home where he was so warm and comfortable. But, after all, is it not the destiny of childishness to be overcome? Man cannot remain a child for ever; he must venture at last into the hostile world. This may be called *"education to reality."* . . .

That may be called the true intransigence of the rationalist mind, and how much vague and musty theological cant it cuts through!

Speaking of Freud, Charles Brenner's *An Elementary Text of Psychoanalysis* (Anchor) is probably the most comprehensive and lucid book written for the layman on psychoanalytic theory since Freud's *A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis* itself. What makes Brenner especially useful is that he traces each point of the theory through its development in Freud's thinking and then brings it up to date with references to later contributions.

And speaking of the rationalist mind, G. K. Chesterton, in his wonderfully witty *George Bernard Shaw* (Dramabooks)—a critical study originally published in 1909—takes Shaw as its finest flower: a mind distinguished by clarity, vigor, and honesty, but incapable of appreciating the importance of those instinctive responses that lie behind such things as religious feeling, patriotism, tradition.

Now it is perfectly true that Shaw was a great believer in the power of reason to accomplish almost any social objective, and it is also true that he never understood the value of irrational human attachments. But this blindness was a deficiency of his own intelligence, his own imagination; it cannot be imputed to the fact that he was a rationalist, or a Puritan, or a radical, or an atheist. Nothing brings this home so forcefully as a reading of Freud: would Chesterton have dared accuse *that* puritanical and atheistic rationalist of blindness to the deeper springs of human motivation?

Nevertheless, for all its wrong-headedness, Chesterton's book is a delightful, good-natured, and shrewd polemic. Chesterton thought he was on a gay crusade for Catholic civilization against Atheism, Puritanism, and Radicalism in the person of Shaw; I think he could have chosen a more formidable representative of those formidable forces. Really, all he did was to write a very funny book about Shaw.

It has been argued again and again since Burke that revolutions are made by the rationalist mind—which Burke described as fanatic and arrogant in its assumption that the intricate pattern of social institutions carefully woven by the work of centuries could be improved upon by a plan conceived abstractly in a philosopher's study—but it is clear from Crane Brinton's *The Anatomy of Revolution* (Vintage) that rationalists form only a small proportion of the people who actually carry revolutions through. "It takes," says Brinton after examining the leaders of four different revolutions, "almost as many kinds of men and women to make a revolution as to make a world." Be that as it may, however, Brinton's book is not about rationalism; it is an attempt to discover "uniformities" in revolution through the use of scientific method. This attempt fails, not because scientific method cannot be applied fruitfully to the study of historical phenomena (Brinton, in fact, argues convincingly that it can), but because the "uniformities" he comes up with usually fit only two or three of the four revolutions he is analyzing. I can't see what the American revolution, which seems to have very little in common with the others—it was, after all, a colonial insurrection rather than an uprising of disaffected classes against the ruling powers—is doing here at all. Even the Puritan rebellion in England rests uneasily in the pattern Brinton draws—a pattern which finally illuminates only the French and Russian revolutions. In any case, Brinton is an urbane writer who carries his scholarship gracefully.

I should like to mention the publication of two other books on revolution—Lefebvre's classic, *The Coming of the French Revolution* (Vintage) and J. S. Curtiss' *The Russian Revolutions of 1917* (Anvil Original)—and another critical volume on Shaw, by Eric Bentley (New Directions).

Norman Podhoretz

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MUSIC

Russian Roulette: Prokofiev Off Broadway

THE PERIOD during which Prokofiev was at work on his opera, *The Gambler* (1916-1928) coincided with the spread, throughout Western countries, of a violent reaction on the part of composers against the aesthetic standards of romanticism. A great deal has been made of the technical innovations which were being perfected at this time but, as the period recedes into the past, it becomes increasingly clear that most of the technical changes were merely extensions of earlier methods. All of Prokofiev's music, for instance, lends itself to conventional analysis—even when (as in this work) the devices he employs are at variance with academic usage. Prokofiev's most distinctive talent—a talent for elegant and refined nose-thumbing—was apparent in his earliest compositions: in the *Sarcasmes*, the *Insincerities* and, of course, the *Classical Symphony*. As a consequence, he was superbly endowed by nature to ride the crest of the tidal wave that was to engulf Western music during the twenties.

Prokofiev never got involved in the profundities of the period; he had the good sense to realize that he would be out of his depth. At the same time, he had outgrown the need for smart-aleck iconoclasm that plagued so many of his contemporaries. His talent had been developed to include an affecting and, at times, profoundly disturbing irony as well as a straightforward lyricism. It is this pair of qualities that distinguishes all of his best music, and it is the absence of irony, coupled with the degeneration of his lyricism into sentimentality, that accounts for the weakness of so many of his later scores.

The Gambler—which is at last getting a production of sorts in New York—shows Prokofiev's talent for the ironic at its fullest development, and at the expense of the lyric. Based on an early novel of Dostoevsky's, Prokofiev's libretto (which he wrote himself) gives him an opportunity to project infinitely more complex characters than the operatic stereotypes admit. Also, the superficial resemblance of certain of the characters (the love-sick hero, the fallen women) to stock types gives him a chance to spoof the Italians—especially Puccini—unmercifully.

The opera is set in the fashionable hotel of a German spa and gambling resort baldly identified as "Roulettenburg," and the action takes place around 1865. It concerns a retired Russian general and his entourage—his mistress, his stepdaughter, his children's tutor, and a usurious marquis who is having an affair with his stepdaughter. Everyone, it turns out, is sleeping with everybody else except the tutor—a mindless, conventional heroic tenor who spends most of the opera complaining about the shabby treatment he is receiving from his beloved Pauline, the stepdaughter of the General and an unspeakable bitch in her own right. Aside from the tutor, the principals are enjoying the prospect of the vast sum of money that they expect to receive when the General's grandmother dies. Granny, fully aware of all this, rises from her deathbed and sails into the hotel, spewing invective and laying about with her cane. She proceeds to the casino, where she loses every kopeck of her fortune, and the last we see of her she is trying to thumb a ride back to her deathbed in Moscow. The General's mistress thereupon departs with a prince, the stepdaughter's lover vanishes, and the General goes off his rocker in one of the few really convincing mad-scenes in opera. Left to her own resources, the stepdaughter throws herself on the tutor who, at the very prospect of having his love requited at last, goes to the casino and proceeds to break the bank. Our knuckle-headed hero then gives all of his winnings to Pauline who, in what appears to be a fit of congenital weak-mindedness, throws the money in his face and goes screaming out of the room in a little mad-scene of her own. As the opera ends, the hero is seen picking up his fortune with something less than his usual remorse.

The musical accompaniment to this amoral tale is as detached as a medical case history. Prokofiev does nothing to enlist our support for his characters. All he wants us to do is to observe their behavior under the conditions he imposes on them. I used to think that his total disregard for human feelings wa sadistic, but I later learned that he wa working in such riddles as this:

> Q. How is a dying man like a wate tap?
>
> A. They both sound like strings, *su ponticello.*

And I'm convinced that the secret o his irony lies in this sort of thing. H is not concerned with how he think people *feel* under stress, but rather how he thinks they *hear* or *sound* under stress. In a famous case, he accompanied the drowning of a horse and rider with the gurglings of a bass clarinet in the lowest register. In this opera, he goes even further by supplying, in the mad scene, not only the sounds he thinks a person going mad might make, but the sounds he thinks such a person might hear as well. We get not only the howls of the madman but also the delicate clatter of the needles inside his skull.

THE ultimate irony is not in the score but in the situation of the production of this deliciously decadent work, which ought to be swathed in dirty red velvet and presented only to an audience of cigar-smoking dowager marchionesses. It is being done off Broadway in a Manhattan neighborhood policed by the most dangerous children in the world. The prudent pedestrian, after turning east on 85th street, will run for his life until he gets to the hall, which is a redecorated ballroom without so much as a proscenium arch or a curtain, and with a totally flat floor.

Once one accepts such limitations, the production is extraordinarily good, from Sonia Lowenstein's ingenious sets to the sensible English adapation by Irving and Georgette Palmer. The singers are all young Americans, and there are enough of them to provide two casts of principals. The performance I heard was dominated by the magnificent singing and acting of Leslie Faber as the General; but Cleo Fry was brilliantly disagreeable as granny, and Margaret Rae was as engaging a fallen female as you could wish. The absence of the orchestra (the accompaniment is played in a two-piano arrangement) is serious enough to compromise the whole undertaking; but it is not serious enough to prevent the thorough enjoyment of a stunning and important modern work.

ROBERT EVETT

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Correspondence

(*Continued from page 3*)

Dulles, Mr. Murphy and six other (any six) State Department officials, in exchange for the eight Americans now held prisoner there. Then ask Mr. Dulles, after he has sat for a year or two on Chinese prison stones, whether the issuance of passports to American correspondents, in exchange for his release, would be yielding to blackmail.

IRVING BRANT

P.S. My wife, on reading the above, says it won't work. Who, she asks, would want to ransom Mr. Dulles?
Washington, D. C.

► *Education and the Educationists*

I CAN hardly believe that many *NR's* readers will agree that "it is ridiculous to suggest" that languages, history, and science are more important than "on-the-job training, safety education, and other life adjustment courses." Nevertheless, there are certain arguments in Nolan Kearney's reply to Arthur Bestor (*NR*, March 25) which deserve to be answered seriously. First, we are told that it would be hard to find, at once, enough qualified teachers for the "enriched," educational program Mr. Bestor suggests. Aside from confusing what was proposed as a goal with a plan for immediate action, this objection tacitly admits two of Mr. Bestor's principal points: that the present system has resulted in a teacher shortage, and that teachers with "pedagogical" training ("the 100,000 teachers who are to be displaced") are insufficiently trained in their subject matter!

But, we are told, "the number of college graduates who haven't had pedagogy are a drop in the bucket and can now teach in most places under provisional certificates." I don't know what the first part of this sentence means: surely Mr. Kearney must know that this group is much larger than that of education students; but with the second part of the sentence we come to the crux of the matter. It is not the not having had courses in "pedagogy" that keeps superior graduates out of the high schools, but the not wanting to have them. I am a college senior: again and again I hear the superior students in my class saying that one major reason they did not consider teaching in the schools was their desire not to waste their time in education courses—it was one of my reasons too.

MICHAEL WIGODSKY

Austin, Texas

The New Republic *welcomes communications from its readers in regard to subjects of current interest. Those of 300 words or less lend themselves to publication more readily than longer letters.*

" . . . snap courses"

ALTHOUGH Mr. Kearney is probably quite right that undergraduate programs in teacher training will only contain about 16 percent courses in pedagogy, this does not complete the story either. Education is still firmly in the hands of those who have specialized in pedagogy. The school administrator with a strong background in some academic field is a rarity.

A working teacher who takes additional college work either to meet promotional requirements or by choice, will almost invariably head for the School of Education. Without opening the argument of whether there are more "snap" courses in education than other fields, a person who is perfunctorily meeting a requirement is going to enroll in an area where he can identify the "snap" courses. The more ambitious teacher knows that the one avenue to the prestige and money of school administration is to specialize in pedagogy too. . . .

JOHN J. BOWEN

Orlando Park, Illinois

" . . . the educational gap"

AFTER studying your two recent articles concerning the education of the gifted child, I have come to the conclusion that many of Nolan Kearney's arguments rest ultimately on the assertion that under present circumstances Arthur Bestor's proposals are unattainable for economic, political, etc. reasons. Other of his arguments are based on statistics which, in themselves, have no meaning to me.

However, there is one point which needs to be clarified. Bestor states that

> . . . then we come around to the position—in my judgment the only sound position—that the great function of the public schools is to narrow the educational gap between the gifted child and the child of average ability.

I believe this statement is made in reference to his feeling that the difference between pupils is a matter of degree, not kind, and that, therefore, all should be subject to the same liberal-type education rather than be channeled into various vocational programs. However, Kearney misconstrues the meaning (I am not concerned here with the result he suggests) of this passage, as can be seen in his treatment of it, while in other portions of his article he explicitly favors vocational, *i.e.* "life adjustment," courses.

Here lies one of the primary problems inherent in democratic education. Our schools, unlike those of Europe, are handicapped in respect to education of the intellect (I am being careful to exclude life adjustment education) due to the fact that a variety of mental capacities are under the same tutelage. Bestor would solve this problem by making the brilliant student " . . . the pacesetter of the school." Kearney does not face up to this solution directly, but I think he denies it implicitly in several passages.

JOSEPH E. ILLICK

Philadelphia, Penna.

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